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THE ANTITRUST DIVISION v. THE PROFESSIONS"NO BIDDING" CLAUSES AND FEE SCHEDULES
I. Introduction
The Department of Justice has recently begun to question the methods used
by lawyers, engineers, architects and certified public accountants in determining
fees. Until recently, the code of ethics of the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants as well as the codes of various engineering and architectural
societies have contained provisions prohibiting the submission of bids to potential
clients.' In addition, many bar associations publish recommended fee schedules
for various services offered to clients. The antitrust division now contends that
both these practices are prohibited by Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.'
Case law dealing with these practices is scarce. Until now the majority of
cases filed have been settled by injunctions entered under consent decrees. On
June 1, 1972, an injunction by consent decree was entered against the American
Society of Civil Engineers enjoining the society from adopting any plan or program which prohibits members from submitting price quotations for engineering
services.' In effect, this forced the society to remove the "no bid" clause from
its code of ethics. It should be noted that such a decree does not act as evidence
or admission with respect to any issue of law or fact.' Similar judgments were
entered later in the year against the American Institute of Architects and the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.5 An action is now pending
against the National Society of Professional Engineers. The Justice Department
alleges that the society's code of ethics, which prohibits members from submitting,
competitive bids for engineering services, violates Section I of the Sherman Act.'
1 An example of such a "no bid" clause is Section 1I(c) of the National Society of Professional Engineers' Code of Ethics:
He shall not solicit or submit engineering proposals on the basis of competitive bidding. Competitive bidding for professional engineering services is defined as the
formal or informal submission, or receipt, of verbal or written estimates of cost or
proposals in terms of dollars, man-days of work required, percentage of construction
cost, or any other measure of compensation whereby the prospective client may
compare engineering services on a price basis prior to the time that one engineer,
or one engineering organization, has been selected for negotiations. The disclosure
of recommended fee schedules prepared by various engineering societies is not
considered to constitute competitive bidding. An engineer requested to submit a fee
proposal or bid prior to the selection of an engineer or firm subject to the negotiation
of a satisfactory contract shall attempt to have the procedure changed to conform
to ethical practices, but if not successful he shall withdraw from consideration for
the proposed work. These principles shall be applied by the engineer in obtaining
the services of other professionals.
Though fee schedules are published by some engineering societies, they are not included, for
the purposes of this article, in sections dealing with "no bid" clauses. The remarks concerning
fee schedules would apply.
2 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
3 United States v. American Soc'y of Civil Eng'rs, Civil No. 72-1776 (S.D.N.Y., June
1, 1972), 1972 TRADa CAs.
73,950.
4 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
5 United States v. American Inst. of Architects, Civ. Act. No. 992-72 (D.D.C., June 19,
1972); 1972 TRAOD CAS. 1173,981; United States v. American Inst. of Certified Public
Accountants, Inc., Civil No. 1091-72 (D.D.C., July 6, 1972), 1972 TRADE CAS. 1 74,007.
6 Complaint of United States, United States v. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs,
Giv. Act. No. 2412-72 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 5, 1972), ANTITRUST AND TRAsn REG. REP. No.
592, at A-15 (1972).
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The society filed a rebuttal arguing, inter alia: First, the work of a human
being is not an article of commerce. Second, competitive bidding in most instances results in an award of the work to be performed to the lowest bidder
regardless of other factors such as ability thereby endangering the public welfare
and safety. Third, the engineering profession traditionally has been regulated
by the state rather than the federal government. Fourth, the society has no
enforcement power.'

The Justice Department has not brought suit against any bar associations
as of this writing. However, a Virginia homeowner, Louis Goldfarb, and two
Virginia fair housing organizations brought class actions against the Virginia
State Bar and three county bar associations alleging "a continuing agreement
of action between the defendants and co-conspirators to raise, fix and maintain
the fees for legal services performed by members of the associations."' The court
found that the schedules involved were published in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act.'
The Justice Department is contemplating similar suits. In an address before the Pennsylvania Bar Association, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce
Wilson alleged that the practice of publishing minimum fee schedules was
"fraught with antitrust dangers and should be abandoned or at least radically
changed if it is to remain outside the forbidden zone."1 0 He argued that fee
schedules are more than merely suggestions and that they limit individual competitive freedom in a manner inconsistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.
He concluded that the effect of these limitations was to deprive the public of the
benefits of lower prices resulting from the efficiency of more competent lawyers. 1
More recently Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Kauper warned the
New York State Bar Association that attorneys have been given enough notice
and that "[i]t may well be that our next warning will be in the form of a complaint."' 2
Thus, in the near future cases will probably be decided establishing whether
a professional organization may regulate the methods of fee determination used
by its members. Previous cases decided by consent decree are of little use in
determining the probable outcome of these cases because the risk of antitrust
litigation is extremely high. The associations which negotiated consent decrees
may have had a strong case but decided that continuing to regulate methods of
fee determination was not worth the risk and cost of litigation. Section 4 of the
Clayton Act provides that any person injured as a result of conduct forbidden by
7 Rebuttal of National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, United States v. National Soc'y
of Professional Eng'rs, Civ. Act. No. 2412-72 (D.D.C., filed Jan. 9, 1973), ANTITRUST AND
TRADE REG. REP. No. 596, at A-2 (1973).
8 Complaint of Plaintiff, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, Civ. Act. No. 75-72-A (E.D.
Va., filed Feb. 22, 1972), ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. No. 552, at A-5 (1972).
9 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, Civ. Act. No. 75-72-A (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1973),
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. No. 595, at H-1 (1973).
10 Address by Bruce B. Wilson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, before the Pennsyl50,131 '(1972)
vania Bar Assn. Conference of County Bar Officers, 5 TRADE REG. REP.
[hereinafter cited as Address by Bruce B. Wilson].

11 Id.

12 Address by Thomas E. Kauper, Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division, before
the New York State Bar Ass'n, Jan. 24, 1973, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP. No. 598,
at D-1 (1973).
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the antitrust laws may recover treble damages plus the cost of suit including

attorney's fees.13 Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides that a judgment
against a defendant in any action brought on behalf of the United States shall
be prima facie evidence against the defendant in any matters where the judgment or decree would be an estoppel. This provision does not apply to a consent
decree. 4 In effect, if one of the associations litigated the validity of a "no bid"
clause or fee schedule and lost, a future plaintiff would only need to prove direct
damages caused by the association's action.
II. Trade or Commerce
Through the history of the Sherman Act the Supreme Court has broadened
the phrase "trade or commerce" to include restraints on services as well as goods.
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader 5 contained dicta stating that the Sherman Act was
intended to prevent restraints which tended to control the market for services
as well as goods. 6 In United States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards" the Supreme Court followed the dicta in Apex Hosiery and held that
the Washington Real Estate Board violated Section 3 of the Sherman Act " by
adopting a fee schedule for realtors' services. Section 3 contains similar language
to Section 1 but applies basically to trade or commerce within the District of
Columbia or the United States territories. The Court stated:
The fact that the business involves the sale of personal services rather than
commodities does not take it out of the category of "trade" within the
meaning of § 3 of the Act. The Act was aimed at combinations organized
and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition "in the
marketing of goods and services."'"
The Court, however, carefully noted that it intimated no opinion at that time
on whether the professions fell within the Act." Subsequent to this decision
the district court of Utah held in United States v. Utah PharmaceuticalAssociation that fee schedules published by an association of pharmacists selling prescription drugs violated the Sherman Act.2 The court stated: "[O]ne cannot
lawfully agree with others to fix the price of goods in commerce merely because
of professional credentials or because such price fixing also touches upon the
matter of professional fees." 22 The Supreme Court later affirmed this decision. "
Utah Pharmaceutical Association is clearly distinguishable from the case of
lawyers or engineers because goods were involved. However, this distinction
13 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
14 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970).
15 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
16 Id. at 493.
17 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
18 15 U.S.C. § 3 '(1970).
19 339 U.S. at 490.
20 Id. at 492.
21 United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), aff'd per
curiam, 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
22 201 F. Supp. at 35; cf. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
23 Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
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may be of little substance since the court previously held that restraints on services fell within the act in National Association of Real Estate Boards. In fact,
in Goldfarb v.Virginia State Bar Association 4 the court held that the Sherman
Act applied to the professions at least with respect to fee schedules.
III. Among the Several States
In Mitchell v.Lublin, McGaughy & Associates 5 the Supreme Court held
that a firm of engineers was engaged in interstate commerce for purposes of the
Fair Labor Standards Acte6 while noting that the commerce test under that Act
was narrower than the test under the commerce clause of the Constitution." In
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v.United States2s the Supreme Court held that Congress exercised "all the power it possessed" in enacting the Sherman Act.29
Thus, any trade or commerce which is appropriate for regulation by Congress
under the commerce clause is subject to the Sherman Act. Since the Court was
willing to hold that engineers were engaged in interstate commerce under the
narrow test applied in Mitchell, it is unlikely that it would hold that engineers
were not engaged in interstate commerce under the broader test applied under
the Sherman Act.
The power of Congress is not limited to regulation of commerce among thq
states. It extends to intrastate activities which affect interstate commerce 0
even if the particular activities being regulated are wholly intrastate."' In
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co."2 the Supreme
Court held that Congress' power to keep the interstate market free of goods
produced under conditions inimical to the general welfare extended to some
cases where there was no specific effect on interstate commerce. The Court
held: "[I]t is enough that the individual activity where multiplied into a general practice is subject to federal control.., or that it contains a threat to the
interstate economy that requires preventative regulation." 3 The effect on interstate commerce need not be large but merely must be more than inconsequential. 4
In light of these cases and the Court's expansive view of the commerce
clause, it is unlikely that the Court would hold that engineering or lawyers'
24 Civ. Act. No. 75-72-A (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1973),
No. 595, at H-1 (1973).

ANTITRUST AND TRADE REo.

REP.

25 358 U.S. 207 (1959).
26 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970).
27 358 U.S. at 211.
28 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
29 Id. at 435; accord, Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940); Las
Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 817 (1954).
30 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
31 Id. at 122; United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464
(1949); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 746 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
32 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
33 Id. at 236.
34 Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 '(1948);
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); Woods Exploration & Producing
Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1971).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April, 1973]

services were not within the regulatory ambit of the Sherman Act. Both engineering firms and law firms cut across state lines in their day-to-day activities.
Neither the services performed by engineers nor those performed by lawyers have
only an "inconsequential effect" on commerce. There is support for this view.
In a white paper prepared by a Task Force on Competitive Bidding Implications,
the spokesmen for the National Association of Professional Engineers practically
conceded that engineering services are within the scope of the Sherman Act."5
In July of 1971 the authors of an article in the American Bar Assaciation Journal alleged, among other things, that fee schedules violated the Sherman Act. 6
In 1972 an article favoring fee schedules was published in response but did not
challenge the contention that lawyers' services were within the scope of the
Act. "7 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association the trial court held that
law firms had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce because much of the
financing for homes being purchased by Virginia residents using lawyers' services
came from out of state.
IV. In Restraint of Trade
The terms of Section 1 of the Sherman Act refer to "Every contract ...
in restraint of trade... ,,"Nevertheless, in Standard Oil v. United States the
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Act does not restrain all contracts which
limit or restrict trade or commerce but only those which are an undue or unreasonable restraint.41 Whether a restraint is reasonable generally depends on the
circumstances surrounding the agreement. However, the Court noted that there
were certain contracts which by their nature and character create a conclusive
presumption of unreasonableness regardless of the expediency or nonexpediency
of the contracts.4' Following Standard Oil two basic theories developed under
which a restraint may be held to violate the Sherman Act. They are generally
termed the "per se rule" and the "rule of reason."
Various restraints have been held illegal per se. Some examples are: agreements between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate
territories in order to minimize competition; 4" tying arrangements;44 group boycotts;4 and price fixing." The only one that is relevant in relation to fee sched35

A White Paper on the Implications of Competitive Bidding for Professional Engineering

Services § 8, PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER, May 1972 [hereinafter cited as White Paper].

36 Arnould and Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A.J. 655 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Arnould and Corley].
37 Miller and Weil, Let's Improve, Not Kill, Fee Schedules, 58 A.B.A.J. 31 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Miller and Weil].
38 Civ. Act. No. 75-72-A (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1973), ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP.
No. 595, at H-1 '(1973).
39 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
40 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
41 Id. at 58-60.
42 Id. at 65; Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 '(1959).
43 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
44 Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
45 Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
46 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927); United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 *(1940).
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ules and "no bid" clauses is price fixing. In United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co." the Supreme Court held:
Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of
a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per se.48
The determination of whether a practice is illegal per se or falls within the
rule of reason is critical. If a practice is within the rule of reason, evidence is
submitted and a finding of fact is made as to whether the restraint is reasonable
or not."9 In determining the reasonableness of a restraint the court will consider
facts peculiar to the business in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the
restraint and its effects, the history of the restraints and the reasons for its adoption." In sharp contrast, evidence regarding motive, intent, good faith or economic benefit is inadmissible if the court finds as a matter of law that a practice
is illegal per se. Elimination of competitive evils is no defense to a practice held
illegal per se."
V. Fee Schedules
The Supreme Court in United States v. National Association of Real Estate
Boards,5 2 held that the Washington Real Estate Board's action in adopting
standard rates was price fixing and as such was a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. Although the district court had made a specific finding that the schedules
were nonmandatory," the Supreme Court held:
An agreement, shown either by adherence to a price schedule or by proof
of consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum price, is itself illegal
under the Sherman Act, no matter what end it was designed to serve....
And the fact that no penalties are imposed for deviations from the price
schedules is not material ....
Subtle influences may be just as effective as
the threat or use of formal sanctions to hold people in line.
has held that a person's professional status is no defense to
The ninth circuit
55
price fixing
In the American Bar Association Journal presentation on fee schedules the
opponents of such schedules contend that they are a means of price fixing and
47 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
48 Id. at 223.
49 Rogers v. Douglas Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc., 266 F.2d 636, 644 (5th Cir.),
denied, 361 U.S. 833 (1959); Lamb Enterprises v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506 (6th
1972), petition for cert. filed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3114 '(U.S. Aug. 28, 1972) (No. 72-339).
50 United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972).
51 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940); Northern
Ry., 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp.
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
52 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
53 Id. at 488.
54 Id. at 489.
55 Northern California Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 385
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962).

cert.
Cir.
Pac.
153

(9th
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eliminate or reduce competition.56 The proponents, on the other hand, cite
statistics which show that 48.3 per cent of practicing attorneys believe fee schedules are not among the top three means of setting fees. They argue that the
schedules are not mandatory and that circumstances may make it appropriate
to charge either more or less than the suggested amount.5" In light of National
Association of Real Estate Boards it is questionable whether the nonmandatory
nature of the schedules is of any significance.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce Wilson, in the speech to the
Pennsylvania Bar Association Conference, discussed earlier, placed emphasis
on the possibility of ethical sanctions being applied for departure from fee
schedules.58 The Disciplinary Rules issued under Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide that the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services should be considered among other factors in determining
a fee.59 As a result of some state and local bar associations suggesting that fee
schedules are mandatory, the American Bar Association Standing Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued a formal opinion on the subject.60 The opinion provided:
[M]ere failure to follow a minimum fee schedule, even when habitual, can
not [sic], standing alone and absent evidence of misconduct, afford a basis
for disciplinary action.

Conversely, if a lawyer wantonly ignores the customary charges for similar
services in his community in fixing his own fees, then he is failing to take
into account one element which both Canon 12 and DR 2-106(B) say
should be considered. 61
Thus, even though fee schedules are not mandatory, failure to follow them could
be a factor in a disciplinary action resulting in sanctions. This is more coercion
than the court found was present in National Association of Real Estate Boards.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar Association" the trial court held that the fee
schedules were illegal per se as price fixing in spite of their nonmandatory nature.
Even assuming the schedules are not illegal per se, there still remains substantial dissent among members of the bar as to the question of reasonableness.
Opponents of fee schedules argue that they are most often used when there is
no reasonable justification for a large fee. They rely on statistics which they
say show that the schedules provide unreasonable fees, that differences in fees
in different areas are not justified by economic conditions, and that they are
not based on time as they purport to be.63
56

Arnould and Corley, supra note 36.

57

Miller and Weil, supra note 37.

58 Address by Bruce B. Wilson, supra note 10.
59 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2, DR 2-106 (B)'(3) (1971).
60 ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Formal
Opinion No. 323 (Aug. 9, 1970).

61 Id.
62 Civ. Act. No. 75-72-A (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1973),
No. 595, at H-i '(1973).
63

Arnould and Corley, supra note 36.
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In summary, under present case law it appears that fee schedules are illegal
per se. If a court so held, no evidence would be admissible in justification of
the practice of publishing them. If a court did not hold that the schedules were
illegal per se, the plaintiff would have the burden of showing that the schedules
were unreasonable as a matter of fact.
VI. "No Bid" Clauses
The case law concerning "no bid" clauses is less definitive because the issue
is more closely related to the right of a professional organization to establish a
code of ethics. This right has been affirmed by the courts." In his speech to
the Pennsylvania Bar Association Conference, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Wilson was careful to limit his remarks "specifically to the question of fees
for services" and not to include "more general programs of bar associations with
respect to ethics and qualifications." 5
Agreements not to submit bids have been held illegal, but the facts of the
cases are dearly distinguishable from the case of "no bid" clauses. In Swift &
Co. v. United States,6' a group of livestock buyers agreed to decide when each
would buy and not to bid against each other at the decided times. The Court
held that such an agreement violated the Sherman Act since price competition
was effectively eliminated. This is distinguishable from "no bid" clauses because
they do not eliminate competition but merely change it in form.6 7 Agreements
among sellers to agree for one person to submit the low bid and all others to
submit higher bids68 and agreements to submit identical bids have also been
held illegal but both are distinguishable since their effect was to fix a purchase
price and thus eliminate all competition.
Mr. Wilson outlined the reasons for bringing suit against various professional organizations when testifying to the House Committee on Government
Operations. He stated:
First, the Department frowns upon two or more members of these, or, in
fact, any other profession, agreeing to any pricing structure for their services. Second, [there is a] departmental philosophy that, if any members
of these professions and any individual requiring their services desire to
participate in any type of selection or procurement procedure then such
persons should be permitted to do so without stigma or limitation imposed
by the codes of ethics of the professional organizations involved.70
The Justice Department thus seeks to broaden the definition of price fixing to
include "two or more members.., of any... profession, agreeing to any pric64 Levin v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964), reed on other

grounds, 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
65

Address by Bruce B. Wilson, supra note 10.

66 196 U.S. 375 (1905).

67 For an explanation of the methods used in procurement of engineering services, see
text accompanying note 74, infra.
68 Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
69 C-0-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344

U.S. 892 (1952).

70 H.R. Rp. No. 1188, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1972).
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ing structure for their services."'" Traditionally the courts have only held certain
specific practices, such as price fixing or group boycotts, illegal per se and have
judged other restraints under the rule of reason. 2 It seems unlikely that the
courts will depart from this well-established policy.
If a court holds that a "no bid" clause is illegal per se, evidence of reasonableness is inadmissible. If "no bid" clauses are not held illegal per se, there
are strong public policy arguments against direct price competition which have
been endorsed by Congress.
VII. Congressional Policy
On October 27, 1972, Congress enacted a bill" introduced by Representative Jack Brooks which amended the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act. The bill codifies the existing system for government procurement of
architectural and engineering services. Under this system requirements are
announced publicly. Contracts are then negotiated on the basis of competence
and qualifications at fair and reasonable prices. The bill provides a mechanism
whereby the three firms most highly qualified to provide the services required
are selected and ranked. The agency head then enters detailed negotiations
with the highest ranked firm. If the agency head and the firm cannot arrive at
a satisfactory agreement, including a reasonable price, negotiations are entered
with the next most qualified firm. This process is continued until an agreement
is reached. Similar procedures are generally used by private companies contracting for engineering services."
The committee reports on this bill accept many of the arguments advanced
by the design professions in favor of their codes of ethics. 5 One of the principal
problems in procurement of design services is lack of standards for measuring
the quality and quantity of services to be performed. At the time the contract
is signed only broad guidelines are available. The House Committee recognized
that it is not practical to require extensive preliminary design and investigative
work.76 In accepting the professions' argument that the initial competition between firms should be based solely on qualification, the committee stated:
Under [the Brooks Bill architects and engineers] are under no compunction
to compromise the quality of the design or the level of effort they will contribute to it in order to meet the lower "fee" quotations of other [architects
and engineers]. They are free to suggest optimum design approaches that
may cost more to design, but can save in construction costs and otherwise
increase the quality of the building or facility to be constructed. 7
The Senate Committee's report contained similar language."
71

Id.

72 See text accompanying notes 39-48, supra.
73 Pub. L. No. 92-582, 86 Stat. 1278 (U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News
6108 (Supp. Dec. 10, 1972)), amending 40 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. (1970).
74 S. REP. No. 1219, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972).
75

White Paper, supra note 35.

76 H.R. REP. No. 1188, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972).
77 Id. at 3.
78 S. REP. No. 1219, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972).
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The Brooks Bill resulted from a controversy started by an opinion of the
Comptroller General which stated that architects and engineers are subject to
the competitive negotiation provisions of the federal procurement laws and as
such must submit price quotations as part of any proposal. 9 Both the House
and Senate Committees considered whether the bill conflicted with any sections
of the antitrust laws in light of the recent cases brought by the Department of
Justice. They concluded it did not. The bill concerns the method used by the
government in procurement; the antitrust cases involve restraints imposed by
the professions applying to anyone seeking services."
The Brooks Bill and similar federal acts8 ' have no direct effect on the
validity of "no bid" clauses under the antitrust law. Nevertheless, they may
serve as strong evidence regarding the reasonableness of restraints imposed by
the professions. The House Committee, recognizing that federal, state and local
governments as well as private business and industry have followed the practices
codified by the Brooks Bill for many years, specifically found that the system
was a "highly acceptable form of cost competition.""
Federal, state and local governments are some of the largest users of design
services. The Brooks Bill provides that the present system will be retained for
federal procurement of these services. The National Society of Professional
Engineers is presently proposing model legislation for enactment by state legislatures.
VIII. State Statutes
State regulation of engineering services has been treated extensively in the
white paper prepared by the Task Force on Competition Bidding Implications
of the National Society of Professional Engineers. 3 Two different types of
statutes are in question: first, state procurement acts and, second, state licensing
statutes with regulatory provisions.
Tennessee and Texas have state procurement statutes.8" Each essentially
provides that no state agency or political subdivision shall use competitive bidding for procurement of any type of professional services. These statutes have
no effect on procurement of professional services by private industry or individuals. Though they apply to all professions, they have their most significant impact on architects and engineers because they do a larger portion of their business with governmental agencies than lawyers, accountants or members of other
professions. This type of statute presents no antitrust questions because only
79 118 CONG. Rzc. 18186 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972) (remarks of Senator Gurney).
80 H.R. RP. No. 1188, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1972); S. REP. No. 1219, 92nd Gong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1972).
81 The Brooks Bill is not the only procurement provision that exempts professional
services from general procedures. See e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 18.402-1 (1972) (Armed Forces
Procurement Regulations); 41 U.S.C. § 252(c) (1970) Federal Property and Administrative
Services Act); 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1970) (Public Contracts Act).
82 H.R. R P. No. 1188, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972).
83 White Paper §§ 12-13; supra note 35.
84 3 TENN. CODE ANN. § 12-432 (Supp. 1971); lB Tax REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 664-4
(Supp. 1972).
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state procurement is involved. The states can use any method of procurement
they desire.
The second type of statute presents significant antitrust questions. Florida
and Ohio currently have statutes which provide that a state supervisory board
shall adopt rules of professional conduct for engineers. The rules are binding
with sanctions provided for violators." The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
for Adoption by State Registration Boards published by the National Society of
Professional Engineers contains a "no bid" clause." These rules are applicable
to all engineers in states where they are adopted and in effect provide an exemption from the antitrust laws in this regard.
Conflicts between state regulatory acts and the antitrust laws have given rise
to litigation in the past. The leading case is Parker v. Brown." Parker concerned the legality of an agricultural price stabilization program adopted by
California which was similar to a federal program then in effect. The Supreme
Court held that nothing in the history of the Sherman Act suggested that Congress intended to restrain a state from activities directed by its legislature. The
Court also noted, however, that a state could not grant immunity by authorizing
someone to violate the antitrust statute." The meaning of Parkeris still partially
unsettled.
In Asheville Tobacco Board of Trade v. F.T.C.8" the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Parker applied: "[w]hen a state
90
has a public policy against free competition in an industry important to it .... "
In a more recent case the same court held that "to find shelter under Parker,
the acts complained of must be the result of state action, either by state officials
or by private individuals 'under the active supervision' of the state ... .""- Thus,
under the fourth circuit's interpretation of Parker the states have a large amount
of power to limit competition in industries important to them. The only limitation is that the restraint cannot be a sham by which individuals evade the antitrust laws.
The D.C. Court of Appeals interprets Parker more narrowly. In Hecht v.
Pro-Football, Inc.92 the court stressed the similarity between federal and state
policy in Parker. Hecht actually dealt with a conflict between federal statutes
but if this interpretation of Parker were followed by other courts, the states
would only have very limited powers to regulate industries within their borders.
The National Society of Professional Engineers' white paper implies that
the Model Rules issued pursuant to Florida- or Ohio-type statutes would be held
valid under either interpretation of Parker.3 If a court followed the broader
view of the fourth circuit line of cases, the statutes and rules would be held
85 15A FLA. STAT. ANN. § 471.11(4)(a) (Supp. 1973); OHIo, REV. CODE § 4733.20(5)
(B) (Anderson Supp. 1972).
86 White Paper,supra note 35.
87 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
88 Id. at 350-51.
89 263 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1959).
90 Id. at 509.
91 Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. and Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251 (4th
Cir. 1971).
92 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1971).
93 White Paper § 12, supra note 35.
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valid if the court found, as a matter of fact, that the state had a legitimate public
interest in eliminating direct price competition in the design professions. This
seems clear. The validity of the statutes and rules is more in doubt under the
Hecht court's interpretation of Parker.
The National Society of Professional Engineers argues that the relationship
between the Brooks Bill and the Florida or Ohio statutes is the same as the relationship between federal and state law in Parker. This is not the case. In Parker,
general stabilization of agricultural prices was the policy of both the federal and
state governments. In the present case Congress has only adopted a policy for
procurement of services by the federal government. In contrast, the Model
Rules, issued under the Florida or Ohio statutes, would declare that it was in the
public interest that no one obtain engineering services on the basis of competitive
bidding. A court may not find this to be a distinction of substance, but if a
court chooses to follow Hecht, this would be a basis on which to invalidate such
a "no bid" policy.
IX. Conclusion
It appears that in the near future the courts will determine whether the
professions may regulate the methods used by their members to determine fees
for professional services. Two types of restraints are involved: fee schedules
and restraints on bidding. The courts will probably find that the professions fall
within the scope of the Sherman Act in that they affect a significant amount of
interstate commerce. Unless the courts are willing to open a substantial exception for the professions, fee schedules will be held illegal per se. The reasonableness of fixed prices is no defense under the per se rule. In contrast to fee schedules, "no bid" clauses are probably not illegal per se and will fall within the
rule of reason. Congressional policy favors the design professions in arguing
that the limitations they have placed on price competition are reasonable.
The states are actively legislating in this area. Two types of statutes are
involved: those which merely provide the method to be used by the state for
procurement of professional services and those which attempt to regulate competition among engineers within the state. The former presents no antitrust
problems but the latter may conflict with the Sherman Act. The law is unclear
but probably the state statutes will be upheld.
If the Antitrust Division is successful in the coming litigation, areas will be
opened to price competition where such competition has previously been limited.
This would have a profound effect on the professions but it remains to be seen
whether the effect would be reduced prices for quality services or, as many have
predicted, lower quality services.
John F. Gaither, Jr.

